I have been working in mobile marketing for the past 12 years. I began by launching an agency - WakeApp. A few years back, as I was looking at the results of one of the projects that I had grown to a significant scale together with my team, I realised that the most interesting things do not happen within the advertising dashboard. They happen rather within the product and through the decisions that alter the economics. The ‘find a client - run ads - earn a commission’ model had simply stopped answering the questions I was interested in by that point. I learned how to build teams and partnerships. Now, I enter products as a partner. Together with my team, we build market leaders, and we earn collectively.
In this article, I’ll share my thoughts about mobile startups, what I look for in teams, how I work with unit economics, and what specific case studies have taught me.
In this article, I’ll share my thoughts about mobile startups, what I look for in teams, how I work with unit economics, and what specific case studies have taught me.
How I Work with Mobile Startups: Product, Money, and Honest Competition Through Numbers
My ideal partner is not a solo visionary, but a strong technical team. I feel most comfortable working with teams of 5–20 people who deeply understand the product and know how to change it quickly. Not just adding features, but truly rebuilding the logic based on data.
My benchmarks are teams like Telegram or the creators of Flo: they build complex products, maintain a high quality bar, and at the same time are ready to have constructive discussions about pivots rather than defend the original idea at all costs.
I don’t expect founders like these to build marketing themselves. What matters much more is their willingness to adapt the product based on real data rather than an internal sense of what feels right. Together, we look at the numbers and the market, and decide which direction to steer the ship: what to improve in the product, which segments to test, and which marketing hypotheses to validate.
My benchmarks are teams like Telegram or the creators of Flo: they build complex products, maintain a high quality bar, and at the same time are ready to have constructive discussions about pivots rather than defend the original idea at all costs.
I don’t expect founders like these to build marketing themselves. What matters much more is their willingness to adapt the product based on real data rather than an internal sense of what feels right. Together, we look at the numbers and the market, and decide which direction to steer the ship: what to improve in the product, which segments to test, and which marketing hypotheses to validate.
A Strong Technical Team Matters More Than a Single Bright Founder
It is difficult to build a sustainable company if even one of the four pillars is weak — strategy, product, marketing, and people.
Strategy is not an investor presentation, as I thought 12 years ago. It is an understanding of the niche, market dynamics, competitors, and how you will make the next move when others catch up.
Product is not a list of features; it is about how the user interacts and uses the app every day, what brings them back to it and what makes them leave.
Marketing starts with unit economics and not with creatives and budgets. How much does it cost to acquire a user? How quickly do they spend their money? How does LTV grow? How do people return to the product? If there are no honest answers to these questions, all beautiful campaigns are meaningless.
People are the team you can retain, motivate and develop when growth stops being a ‘fun adventure’ and simply turns into work.
An entrepreneur either understands these four pillars of success or delegates parts of them mindfully, that is, with a clear strategy and vision. Without balance between these pillars, building a market leader would be extremely difficult.
Strategy is not an investor presentation, as I thought 12 years ago. It is an understanding of the niche, market dynamics, competitors, and how you will make the next move when others catch up.
Product is not a list of features; it is about how the user interacts and uses the app every day, what brings them back to it and what makes them leave.
Marketing starts with unit economics and not with creatives and budgets. How much does it cost to acquire a user? How quickly do they spend their money? How does LTV grow? How do people return to the product? If there are no honest answers to these questions, all beautiful campaigns are meaningless.
People are the team you can retain, motivate and develop when growth stops being a ‘fun adventure’ and simply turns into work.
An entrepreneur either understands these four pillars of success or delegates parts of them mindfully, that is, with a clear strategy and vision. Without balance between these pillars, building a market leader would be extremely difficult.
Four Pillars Without Which You Cannot Build a Market Leader
A typical scenario starts not with an advertising dashboard but with the product itself. We get to know the team, analyze the current version of the app, the metrics and the market. Then, I define the direction in which the product needs to move: what to simplify, what to strengthen and what to remove.
The team makes improvements, comes back and we launch tests across advertising channels. This is when the ping-pong begins: we look at acquisition costs, early retention, payback dynamics and user behavior. If the economics do not meet expectations, the ball goes back to the product team — they improve it, bring it back and we test again. This cycle can take a year, two years, sometimes even three.
When the product starts achieving the target economics we set at the beginning, the real scaling phase begins. At this point, we have the confidence to double the budget or increase it threefold, or even by five times as much. For me, every such case is a result of joint product and marketing work, not the victory of a single department.
The team makes improvements, comes back and we launch tests across advertising channels. This is when the ping-pong begins: we look at acquisition costs, early retention, payback dynamics and user behavior. If the economics do not meet expectations, the ball goes back to the product team — they improve it, bring it back and we test again. This cycle can take a year, two years, sometimes even three.
When the product starts achieving the target economics we set at the beginning, the real scaling phase begins. At this point, we have the confidence to double the budget or increase it threefold, or even by five times as much. For me, every such case is a result of joint product and marketing work, not the victory of a single department.
How the Work Looks in Practice: A Ping-Pong Between Product and Marketing
In my mind, there is no separate concept of a “marketing budget” without considering payback. There is the cost of acquiring a user and the period within which the invested money needs to be returned.
Let’s say we decide upfront that the product should pay back within six months. Then we break this down by month: for example, 40% return in the first month, 20% in the second, and then 10% each month until reaching a plateau. If we do not fit into this framework, it is a signal not only to optimize advertising campaigns but also to change the product.
One of the key outcomes I aim for is when we do not simply make marketing cheaper but improve the product in a way that shortens the payback period, for example, from six months to three. At that point, you can stop thinking in terms of “100 thousand” and allow yourself to invest “500 thousand” per month while staying within reasonable risk limits.
In the end, everyone wins: founders get scale and the team builds a product that grows not through aggressive advertising but through healthy economics.
Let’s say we decide upfront that the product should pay back within six months. Then we break this down by month: for example, 40% return in the first month, 20% in the second, and then 10% each month until reaching a plateau. If we do not fit into this framework, it is a signal not only to optimize advertising campaigns but also to change the product.
One of the key outcomes I aim for is when we do not simply make marketing cheaper but improve the product in a way that shortens the payback period, for example, from six months to three. At that point, you can stop thinking in terms of “100 thousand” and allow yourself to invest “500 thousand” per month while staying within reasonable risk limits.
In the end, everyone wins: founders get scale and the team builds a product that grows not through aggressive advertising but through healthy economics.
About Unit Economics
One of my past projects involved image-related technologies: AR filters, image overlays and visual content generation. The team was developing with a B2B mindset creating a tool for online stores which would allow them to generate product photos without photoshoots. The product was interesting, the team was strong but according to the numbers, revenue remained at the level of tens of thousands of dollars per month.
We looked at the market and saw that the same technologies in a B2C format, with entertainment-driven use cases and trending effects, had completely different dynamics. There were already apps on the market using similar technology that followed a mass-market approach and scaled much higher. We suggested that the team not abandon B2B, but also enter the consumer segment in parallel.
This is not a case of ‘bringing in a marketer and everything grows.’ The team continued working hard on the product, and together we analyzed metrics and user behavior. My role here was to bring an outside market perspective and help redirect the product toward a space where it can truly scale.
We looked at the market and saw that the same technologies in a B2C format, with entertainment-driven use cases and trending effects, had completely different dynamics. There were already apps on the market using similar technology that followed a mass-market approach and scaled much higher. We suggested that the team not abandon B2B, but also enter the consumer segment in parallel.
This is not a case of ‘bringing in a marketer and everything grows.’ The team continued working hard on the product, and together we analyzed metrics and user behavior. My role here was to bring an outside market perspective and help redirect the product toward a space where it can truly scale.
Case 1. How a Shift Toward Mass Market Changes the Scale
Another illustrative case is a portfolio of around 10–15 subscription-based products for productivity apps and utilities, such as translation services, call recorders, scanners, weather apps, weather event trackers. For several years, we improved monetization every day while continuously shifting focus with regards to marketing: one app performs better today — we scale it; another performs better tomorrow — we switch.
Gradually, advertising budgets grew to $3–5 million per month with careful payback control. This was not a breakthrough moment. It was the result of years of working with numbers and product improvements.
The document scanner was a particularly interesting case. We spent about two and a half years improving it and at a certain point, the economics reached the level we were aiming for, and we increased the advertising budget 15 times as much in a single month. Revenue grew approximately seven to tenfold.
This is also where we learned an important lesson: growth of this scale in such a short period is always an anomaly from the platform’s perspective. The platform detected the sudden change in dynamics and blocked the account, and the product temporarily became unavailable to users. This is an unfortunate part of the journey but it is also part of real experience: when you operate at large volumes and deal with sharp spikes, you need to be prepared — have backup accounts, diversify channels and never rely entirely on a single traffic source.
Gradually, advertising budgets grew to $3–5 million per month with careful payback control. This was not a breakthrough moment. It was the result of years of working with numbers and product improvements.
The document scanner was a particularly interesting case. We spent about two and a half years improving it and at a certain point, the economics reached the level we were aiming for, and we increased the advertising budget 15 times as much in a single month. Revenue grew approximately seven to tenfold.
This is also where we learned an important lesson: growth of this scale in such a short period is always an anomaly from the platform’s perspective. The platform detected the sudden change in dynamics and blocked the account, and the product temporarily became unavailable to users. This is an unfortunate part of the journey but it is also part of real experience: when you operate at large volumes and deal with sharp spikes, you need to be prepared — have backup accounts, diversify channels and never rely entirely on a single traffic source.
Case 2. Years of Work, $3–5 Million per Month, and a Lesson About Anomalous Growth
I do not take on every product that comes my way. I have defined three filters for myself which determine whether or not I take up a project.
1 — The niche
It needs to be large enough for the product to have real potential to become a significant market player.
2 — Connection with the team
We need to genuinely understand each other. Otherwise, every decision turns into a prolonged debate.
3 — Business and key metrics audit
I look at how the current unit economics are structured, what the existing strengths are, where the critical gaps are, and what growth hypotheses exist.
A good example of when I reject work on a project is apps with very limited niches and with short user lifecycles. Even if the team is strong and the product is high-quality, without real long-term retention scenarios, it remains a risky venture.
Additionally, with projects without a single strong market analogue, you sometimes have to rely only on intuition. Sometimes it works, sometimes it does not. I prefer to be cautious: it is better to honestly say “we are not the right fit for each other” than to enter a project where the chances of scaling are low from the start.
1 — The niche
It needs to be large enough for the product to have real potential to become a significant market player.
2 — Connection with the team
We need to genuinely understand each other. Otherwise, every decision turns into a prolonged debate.
3 — Business and key metrics audit
I look at how the current unit economics are structured, what the existing strengths are, where the critical gaps are, and what growth hypotheses exist.
A good example of when I reject work on a project is apps with very limited niches and with short user lifecycles. Even if the team is strong and the product is high-quality, without real long-term retention scenarios, it remains a risky venture.
Additionally, with projects without a single strong market analogue, you sometimes have to rely only on intuition. Sometimes it works, sometimes it does not. I prefer to be cautious: it is better to honestly say “we are not the right fit for each other” than to enter a project where the chances of scaling are low from the start.
How I Choose Which Projects to Work With
Strategically, I am interested in B2C mobile apps in large categories: health and fitness, entertainment, productivity, utilities, and e-commerce — verticals with a real audience scale and the potential for long-term user engagement.
I have experience working with Europe, the US, Brazil, as well as cases in Asia and Africa — each region has its own consumption culture, and this needs to be taken into account. Another important criterion is the user lifetime within the product. I would rather choose an app that a person can use for years than a niche with a short lifecycle and a limited audience.
I am also closely following what is happening at the intersection of AI and mobile products. Wherever models become part of everyday user scenarios — in health, productivity, and personalization — new opportunities emerge for long-term retention and unconventional monetization. I am interested in projects that can both scale through strong numbers and deliver tangible value to users.
I have experience working with Europe, the US, Brazil, as well as cases in Asia and Africa — each region has its own consumption culture, and this needs to be taken into account. Another important criterion is the user lifetime within the product. I would rather choose an app that a person can use for years than a niche with a short lifecycle and a limited audience.
I am also closely following what is happening at the intersection of AI and mobile products. Wherever models become part of everyday user scenarios — in health, productivity, and personalization — new opportunities emerge for long-term retention and unconventional monetization. I am interested in projects that can both scale through strong numbers and deliver tangible value to users.
